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1.  The Principal Officer Argument ...................................87 




[A]s liberty can have nothing to fear from the judiciary alone, 
but would have everything to fear from its union with either of the 
other departments . . . it is in continual jeopardy of being overpow-
ered, awed, or influenced by its co-ordinate branches. 
–The Federalist Papers, No. 781 
 
     One principle that generally guides courts in the United States 
and Canada is the individual’s right to a neutral magistrate.2 For ex-
ample, suppose that you are faced with the misfortune of being pros-
ecuted for a crime. You face a tough prosecutor, but you trust the 
process to lead to a fair result. Soon, you realize that the judge is not 
as neutral as you once thought she was. Upon closer examination, 
you realize that the judge answers entirely to the governor of your 
state and retains very little protection from removal by the governor. 
As a result, you fear that the judge will determine your fate with an 
eye towards appeasing the political objectives of a political figure. 
Clearly, this hypothetical is anathema to the guiding principle of ju-
dicial neutrality. Or, rather, consider this hypothetical: You are 
standing in front of a judge, but this judge has not only been vocal 
against people in your same shoes, but has also been known to rule 
against people with your type of claim ninety-five percent of the 
time. Couple this with the fact that this judge serves a fixed term and 
is relying upon the graces of a political figure for reappointment 
when their term comes to an end. Both hypotheticals seem to be 
contrary to the principle of the separation of powers. 
 
 1 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 392-93 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 
2009). 
 2 See U.S. CONST. amend IV; Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to 
the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, § 7 (U.K.). 
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Yet, the first hypothetical is the situation that immigrants find 
themselves dealing with in America,3 and the second is the situation 
that immigrants find themselves dealing with in Canada.4 In both 
systems, major questions have been raised regarding public trust and 
institutional bias against each nation’s version of the Executive.5 
Changing an entire system seems like a mammoth undertaking; are 
there any methods that normal legal practitioners can take in ensur-
ing that immigration judiciaries maintain impartiality and insulation 
from the political agendas of political figures? 
This Note will proceed to answer this question in multiple parts. 
In Part I, this Note will provide a brief background of both the Ca-
nadian and American immigration courts, particularly their compo-
sition. In Part II, this Note will briefly detail the civil service systems 
of both Canada and the United States and will highlight where each 
immigration judiciary resides within those frameworks. In Part III, 
this Note will argue that to reduce the purported bias and politiciza-
tion of each respective judiciary, it is necessary for these systems to 
become further entrenched in their respective nation’s civil service 
systems, rather than the “one foot in, one foot out” approach that is 
currently in force. In Part III, this Note will highlight the specific 
issues facing each system, as well as provide practical arguments 
that practitioners in the field can make to provide for such insulation 
within their civil service systems. 
II. IMMIGRATION SYSTEMS 
A. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 
Enacted in 2001, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 
(IRPA) established the current Immigration and Refugee Board 
(IRB) of Canada.6 IRPA created a detailed structure of who makes 
 
 3 See Tal Kopan, AG William Barr Promotes Immigration Judges with High 
Asylum Denial Rates, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE (Aug. 23, 2019, 8:09 PM), 
https://www.sfchronicle.com/politics/article/AG-William-Barr-promotes-
immigration-judges-with-14373344.php?psid=o3YbU. 
 4 See Jacqueline Bonisteel, Ministerial Influence at the Canadian Immigra-
tion and Refugee Board: The Case for Institutional Bias, 27 REFUGE J. 103, 105 
(2010). 
 5 See Kopan, supra note 3; see also Bonisteel, supra note 4. 
 6 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, C 27 (Can.). 
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up the IRB and how these members are appointed.7 The IRB is com-
posed of the Refugee Protection Division, the Refugee Appeal Di-
vision, the Immigration Division, and the Immigration Appeal Di-
vision.8 This Note will focus mainly on the Refugee Protection Di-
vision, which handles asylum claims, because the risks of any polit-
ical bias would be the most damaging here. Members of the IRB are 
appointed to their positions by “the Governor in Council, to hold 
office during good behavior for a term not exceeding seven years, 
subject to removal by the Governor in Council at any time for 
cause.”9 Although the statutory language is silent on any further de-
tails regarding appointment, the Cabinet subjects potential appoin-
tees to a rigorous vetting process.10 For example, potential board 
members undergo “written tests, [and] are screened and interviewed 
by IRB officials, external experts and panels . . . before being rec-
ommended by the Minister for appointment.”11 
B. The Executive Office of Immigration Review 
The United States immigration judiciary is formally referred to 
as the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR).12 On Janu-
ary 9, 1983, Congress established the EOIR as an executive agency 
within the Department of Justice “to adjudicate immigration cases 
by fairly, expeditiously, and uniformly interpreting and administer-
ing the Nation’s immigration laws.”13 According to the Code of Fed-
eral Regulations, these immigration judges are the literal represen-
tation of the Attorney General in all immigration proceedings.14 In 
other words, the Executive hires these judges through an internal 
process. As of 2018, President Trump has removed most civil ser-
vice requirements, such as written exams, from the hiring of admin-
istrative law judges (ALJs), as immigration judges are classified 
 
 7 Id. §§ 151-53. 
 8 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, C 27, § 151 (Can.). 
 9 Id. § 153(1)(a). 
 10 See Innessa Colaiacovo, Not Just the Facts: Adjudicator Bias and Deci-
sions of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (2006-2011), 1 J. ON 
MIGRATION & HUM. SECURITY 122, 124 (2013). 
 11 Id. at 124.. 
 12 Executive Office of Immigration Review, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir (last visited Sept. 16, 2020). 
 13 Id. 
 14 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10 (2014). 
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under this category.15 The President has retained only one minimum 
standard for ALJ recruitment: possession of a license to practice 
law.16 In 2018, the Supreme Court in Lucia v. SEC17 effectively 
ruled that SEC ALJs are “officers” under the Appointments Clause, 
which may lead future attorneys general (if they presume ALJs to 
be “inferior” officers under the Appointments Clause) to believe that 
they are free to appoint these judges in any way they see fit so long 
as the constitutional minimum—a simple bar license—is met.18 
Although appointments of immigration judges may now have 
very little, if any, criteria for hiring,19 are there removal protections 
for these judges? Could the Attorney General remove immigration 
judges that flout his or her policy objectives? Congress has provided 
ALJs a blanket protection from arbitrary removal, where ALJs can 
only be disciplined or removed for “good cause established and de-
termined by the Merit System Protection Board.”20 However, this 
protection is less secure than it seems. Some federal circuits have 
held that agencies can set the standards for the quality of decision-
making that could establish removal “for cause.”21 Therefore, 
agency heads have vast discretion to remove ALJs because they can 
establish the criteria themselves. Nevertheless, Congress passed this 
law years before Lucia, indicating that this blanket protection may 
or may not be applicable to ALJs anymore and could even be ren-
dered unconstitutional for the same reasons as the hiring criteria 
above. 
C. The Appointments Clause 
The Constitution vests the President of the United States with 
the power to appoint ministers that will help him or her with the 
power to execute the laws of the United States.22 The Constitution 
states that the President: 
 
 15 Exec. Order No. 13,843, 83 Fed. Reg. 32755 (July 10, 2018). 
 16 Id. 
 17 Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018). 
 18 Exec. Order No. 13,843, supra note 15. 
 19 See id. 
 20 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a). 
 21 See Nash v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675, 676 (2d. Cir. 1989). 
 22 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Con-
sent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other 
public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme 
Court, and all other Officers of the United States, 
whose Appointments are not herein otherwise pro-
vided for, and which shall be established by Law: but 
the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of 
such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the 
President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads 
of Departments.23 
The text of this clause provides more questions than answers. 
Who are “Officers of the United States”? Who are “inferior Offic-
ers”? How does the clause define “Courts of Law” and “Heads of 
Departments”? Lastly, does the Constitution allow these officers to 
be appointed in another manner? The Supreme Court has attempted 
to answer some of these questions, albeit with little clarification. 
The Court provided a definitive answer as to whether the Con-
stitution is permissive of other manners of the appointment of offic-
ers.24 In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court determined that the appointment 
of commissioners to the Federal Election Committee was in viola-
tion of the Appointments Clause because, in passing the Federal 
Election Campaign Act, Congress retained the power to appoint four 
of the six members of the commission.25 The Court found that such 
a method of appointment violated the clause because the text was 
clear in establishing who may appoint officers—that is, the Presi-
dent.26 Put differently, the Appointments Clause explicitly left Con-
gress out of this equation, with the very narrow exception of seeking 
the advice and consent of the Senate for confirmations.27 Therefore, 
the Court has made clear that the Appointments Clause is the only 
method of appointing officers. 
Another question that the Court has provided some guidance on 
is what differentiates an “officer” and a simple “employee” of the 
 
 23 Id. 
 24 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 25 Id. at 125-26. 
 26 Id. at 127 
 27 Id. 
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Executive Branch.28 In Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue, the Court held that special trial judges that help the Tax Court 
judges are indeed officers, and not mere employees, because “they 
perform more than ministerial tasks,”29 and “they take testimony, 
conduct trials, rule on the admissibility of evidence, and have the 
power to enforce compliance with discovery orders.”30 Therefore, 
the Court provided some rubric to examine whether one is an officer 
or employee, albeit slightly obscure. This determination would be 
further changed through the Court’s ruling in Lucia v. SEC,31 which 
will be discussed in further detail in another Part. 
Finally, the Court has offered some guidance on the difference 
between a “principal” officer, which requires the advice and consent 
of the Senate, and an “inferior” officer, whose appointment is de-
cided entirely by the “Heads of Departments” or “Courts of Law.”32 
In Morrison v. Olson, the Court held that a judicially appointed in-
dependent counsel was an inferior officer rather than a principal of-
ficer because he can be removed by the Attorney General for cause, 
has inferior power to the Attorney General, and is appointed for a 
limited tenure with limited jurisdiction.33 However, unsatisfied with 
the fact that such a rubric implies that every officer that is not a Cab-
inet member is inferior, the Court revisited the issue in Edmond v. 
United States.34 The Court modified the test with a much more strict 
rubric, stating that inferior officers are those “whose work is di-
rected and supervised at some level by others who were appointed 
by Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Sen-
ate.”35 Such a ruling did not anticipate the Court’s decision in Lucia, 
which would offer a significant change to our understanding of 
where ALJs, particularly immigration judges, would be classified. 
 
 28 See Freytag v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868 (1991). 
 29 Id. at 881. 
 30 Id. at 881-82. 
 31 See Lucia, 138 S. Ct. 2044. 
 32 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
 33 Id. at 671-72. 
 34 See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 (1997) (emphasis added). 
 35 Id. at 663. 
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II. CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEMS 
A. The American Civil Service System 
Under Title V of the United States Code, executive agencies 
have the authority to “employ such number of employees of the var-
ious classes . . . as Congress may appropriate for from year to year.36 
Employment under this Title is under the purview of the Office of 
Personnel Management (OPM) whose Director is responsible for 
“executing, administering, and enforcing . . . the civil service rules 
and regulations of the President and the Office and the laws govern-
ing the civil service . . . .”37 as well as “aiding the President, as the 
President may request, in preparing such civil service rules as the 
President prescribes.”38 Title V also generally prescribes how ALJs 
are to be appointed under the OPM.39 Agencies that require formal 
proceedings under sections 556 and 557 “shall appoint as many 
ALJs as are necessary.”40 
Through the OPM, the President must provide rules that estab-
lish “open, competitive examinations for testing applicants for ap-
pointment in the competitive service which are practical in character 
and . . . relate to matters that fairly test the relative capacity and fit-
ness of the applicants for the appointment sought.”41 Under the 
OPM regulations, ALJs are designated as positions within the com-
petitive service42 and the Director of the OPM “shall prescribe the 
examination methodology in the design of each ALJ examina-
tion.”43 Although the OPM has refused to undertake the whole hir-
ing process for ALJs for other agencies, OPM does possess authority 
to 
(1) Recruit and examine applicants for ALJ posi-
tions, including developing and administering the 
ALJ examinations . . . (2) Assure that decisions con-
cerning the appointment, pay, and tenure of ALJs in 
 
 36 5 U.S.C. § 3101 (1966). 
 37 Id. § 1103(a)(5)(A). 
 38 Id. § 1103(a)(7). 
 39 See id. § 3105. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. § 3304(a)(1). 
 42 5 C.F.R. § 930.201(b) (2020). 
 43 Id. § 930(201)(d). 
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Federal agencies are consistent with applicable laws 
and regulations; [and] (3) Establish classification and 
qualification standards for ALJ positions.44 
Nevertheless, although the ALJs are hired by their own agencies, 
the OPM statutorily retains the power to “determine . . . the level in 
which each administrative law judge position shall be placed and the 
qualifications to be required for appointment to each level.”45 
Congress afforded ALJs some level of statutory protection from 
at-will termination.46 Under Title V of the United States Code, ac-
tions can be taken against ALJs by their respective agencies “only 
for good cause established and determined by the Merit Systems 
Protection Board on the record after opportunity for hearing before 
the Board.”47 Such actions could consist of removals, suspensions, 
reductions in grade, reductions in pay, and/or a furlough of thirty 
days or less.48 Only after this determination of good cause is removal 
of ALJs possible.49 The implication of this is that “an agency other 
than the hiring agency is ultimately responsible for the ALJ’s ten-
ure” because the hiring agency cannot remove an ALJ without a 
good cause determined by another agency.50 However, such review 
by the Board becomes less clear with regard to exactly what stand-
ards the Board needs to use. Nevertheless, the circuits seem to indi-
cate that the standards that ALJs must meet are set by the agencies 
themselves.51 
Therefore, ALJs in the American context retain a significant 
amount of protections that are granted to members of the civil ser-
vice, including independent recruitment and examination from OPM 
as well as protection through the Merit Board with the very key limit 
noted above. 
 
 44 Id. § 930.201(e)(1-3). 
 45 5 U.S.C. § 5372(b)(2) (2020). 
 46 See id. § 7521(a). 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. § 7521(b)(1-5). 
 49 Id. 
 50 GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 315 (Thomson West, 8th 
ed. 2018). 
 51 See id.; see also Nash v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675, 681 (2d Cir. 1989) (“[I]t 
was entirely within the Secretary’s discretion to adopt reasonable administrative 
measures in order to improve the decision-making process.”). 
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B. Location of Immigration Judges within the Civil Service 
Although the Southern Poverty Law Center disputes the claim 
that American immigration judges are actually ALJs,52 the Depart-
ment of Justice clearly refers to them as “administrative law 
judges”53 and the Code of Federal Regulations asserts that they are 
“administrative judges” appointed by the Attorney General.54 Be-
cause the Immigration and Nationality Act and the Code of Federal 
Regulations do not expressly nor implicitly indicate that the above 
civil service rules do not apply to immigration judges, the civil ser-
vice rules and protections would apply to immigration judges as 
ALJs, at least prior to 2018.55 After the Supreme Court’s 2018 deci-
sion in Lucia, the status of ALJs with regard to how they are hired 
and fired has been called into question and will be discussed later in 
this Note.56 For now, this section will detail the status of the hiring 
of immigration judges prior to Lucia. 
Prior to 2018, immigration judges were selected through a seven 
step hiring process as was the Attorney General’s right under 5 
C.F.R. section 930.201(e).57 Signed off by former Attorney General 
Alberto Gonzales in 2007, the first step in this process required be-
tween seven to nine immigration judges from among the Chief Im-
migration Judge, Deputy Chief Immigration Judges, and Assistant 
Chief Immigration Judges to “evaluate and recommend applica-
tions,” placing them in one of three categories: “Highly 
 
 52 The Attorney General’s Judges: How the U.S. Immigration Courts Became 
a Deportation Tool SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER (June 25, 2019), 
https://www.splcenter.org/20190625/attorney-generals-judges-how-us-immigra-
tion-courts-became-deportation-tool (“Immigration judges are not even ‘adminis-
trative law judges,’ whose authority derives from Article I of the Constitution and 
who conduct proceedings under the Administrative Procedure Act.”). 
 53 Meet the Administrative Law Judges, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/meet-administrative-law-judges (last visited Sept. 
13, 2020) (“EOIR’s administrative law judges (ALJs) serve in the Office of the 
Chief Administrative Hearing Officer.”). 
 54 8 C.F.R. §1003.10(a). 
 55 Lawson, supra note 50, at 315. 
 56 See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2044 (2018). 
 57 Lee Liberman Otis, Memorandum for the Attorney General: Immigration 
Judge Hiring Process (March 29, 2007), as reprinted in Dana J. Boente, Memo-
randum for the Attorney General: Immigration Judge Hiring Process (April 4, 
2007), at 6. 
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Recommend,” “Recommend,” and “Do Not Recommend.”58 There-
after, the Office of the Chief Immigration Judge (OCIJ) will then 
separate the applications into three preliminary tiers.59 The appli-
cants in the first tier must contain those applications where more 
than half of the initial evaluating judges categorized the application 
as “Highly Recommend.”60 The second tier must contain applica-
tions where at least one evaluator categorized the application as 
“Highly Recommend.”61 The third tier contains only those applica-
tions that only received “Recommend” and “Do Not Recommend” 
categorizations.62 At the end of this step, the Director of the EOIR 
and the Chief Immigration Judge will once again review the appli-
cations in the second and third tiers “to determine whether any 
should be included in the first tier.”63 
In Step Two of the Gonzales Process, OCIJ begins contacting 
each applicant in the first tier, requesting a writing sample and work 
references.64 Then, in Step Three, multiple three-member EOIR 
panels composed of either two Deputy Chief Immigration Judges or 
Assistant Chief Immigration Judges and one senior EOIR manager 
will begin conducting interviews with all applicants in the first tier.65 
After each interview, the panels will create packets on each inter-
view, which include cover letters, resumes, and application materi-
als.66 In Step Four, the Chief Immigration Judge and the EOIR Di-
rector will choose the best three candidates based off of those pack-
ets.67 Then, in Step Five, another three member panel that consists 
of the EOIR Director, a career member of the Senior Executive Ser-
vice chosen by the Deputy Attorney General, and a non-career mem-
ber of the Senior Executive Service will be established and “will 
interview as many of the three candidates as they think appropri-
ate.”68 This panel will then recommend one of these three applicants 
 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Otis, supra note 57, at 6. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
70 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:59 
 
to the Deputy Attorney General, who, in turn, will recommend the 
applicant for the Attorney General for approval.69 In Step Six, the 
Attorney General makes his or her final selection.70 Finally, in Step 
Seven, after a background check, the applicant chosen receives an 
initial appointment and will proceed to complete the required train-
ing which includes an immigration law exam.71 After this training, 
the applicant is ready to begin hearing immigration cases.72 
However, this process underwent a significant change in 2017 
when former Attorney General Jeff Sessions altered the Gonzales 
Process.73 Aiming to “generally streamline and shorten the current 
process,” Sessions altered features of the process that he deemed to 
take too long to make a hiring decision.74 In Gonzales’s First Step, 
Sessions chose to eliminate the duty of the Director of the EOIR and 
the Chief Immigration Judge in re-reviewing the second and third 
tiers for the purpose of ensuring that there were not any applicants 
that needed to be bumped up.75 Another change, in Step Three, was 
Sessions’s mandate that the three-member panel interviews have a 
one-month deadline to be completed.76 In Step Four, Sessions man-
dated that the EOIR Director select five applicants, instead of three, 
to “give more discretion to the panels at the next stage.”77 At Step 
Five, rather than three panelists who would recommend a finalist, 
two members would take its place; they would have two weeks to 
make their decision.78 Moreover, at this same step, Sessions author-
ized the concurrent establishment of one panel to fill more than one 
vacant position at a given time.79 Finally, at Step Seven, the Attor-
ney General is now authorized to provide the applicant a temporary 
appointment until they have received a full background check.80 
 
 69 Otis, supra note 57, at 6. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Dana J. Boente, Memorandum for the Attorney General: Immigration 
Judge Hiring Process (April 4, 2007). 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Boente, supra note 73. 
 80 Id. 
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In sum, the hiring of immigration judges changed from an in-
depth, multi-layered review process of each applicant in the Gonza-
les Process to a streamlined and expedited version under the Ses-
sions Process. 
C. Canadian Civil Service System 
The Canadian civil service system, officially known as the Ca-
nadian Public Service, is governed primarily by two significant 
pieces of legislation: The Public Service Employment Act (PSEA) 
and the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment 
Act (hereinafter “Labour Relations Act”).81 Under the PSEA, the 
Canadian Public Service is generally controlled by the Public Ser-
vice Commission, who “has the exclusive authority to make ap-
pointments, to or from within the public service, of persons for 
whose appointment there is no authority in or under any other Act 
of Parliament.”82 The Commission’s objective when making hiring 
decisions is to hire exclusively on the basis of merit, which is 
achieved when “the person to be appointed meets the essential qual-
ifications for the work to be performed . . . .”83 
Employees of the Canadian Public Service could be laid-off in 
accordance with regulations that the Commission has passed pursu-
ant to its statutory authority.84 Removals pursuant to a lay-off can 
only occur after a deputy head of the Commission 
assess[es] the merit of the employees employed in 
similar positions or performing similar duties in the 
same occupational group and level within that part of 
the organization, and identify, in accordance with 
merit, the employees who are to be retained . . . and 
the remaining employees who are to be advised that 
their services are no longer required and are to be laid 
off.85 
 
 81 See Public Service Employment Act, S.C. 2003, C 22, pmbl. (Can.); see 
Federal Public Sector Labour Relations Act, S.C. 2003, pmbl. (Can.). 
 82 See Public Service Employment Act, S.C. 2003, C 22, § 29(1) (Can.) (em-
phasis added). 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. § 64(1). 
 85 Public Service Employment Regulations, SOR/2005-334, § 21(1) (Can.). 
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Therefore, labor cuts are afforded a level of process where the 
Commission determines who is not absolutely essential according 
to their merit. However, the PSEA also provides protections to those 
in the Public Service who are removed from their appointed posi-
tions.86 For example, if an appointee to the Public Service has her 
appointment revoked if there was “improper conduct that affected 
the selection of the person appointed or proposed for appoint-
ment,”87 that appointee is statutorily provided with recourse to file a 
complaint asserting the unreasonableness of the revocation.88 In 
fact, the PSEA provides recourse even to those that were not ap-
pointed but who were passed over for an appointment that was given 
to another if it were done as a result of an abuse of authority.89 
While the PSEA provides this recourse, the Labour Relations 
Act provides the specific methodology.90 Established in 2013, the 
Labour Relations Board “administers the collective bargaining and 
grievance adjudication systems for the federal public sector” and is 
responsible for “resolving staffing complaints under the PSEA that 
are related to internal appointments and layoffs . . . .”91 This Board 
provides a trial-like hearing,92 where witnesses are summoned and 
compelled to give testimony93; requires prehearing procedures take 
place94; and allows compulsion of documents to be produced at any 
stage of the proceeding.95 Furthermore, the Canadian Parliament has 
ordered that every decision of this Board “is not to be questioned or 
reviewed in any court . . . .,” with the exception of situations de-
scribed in paragraph 18.1(4)(a), (b), or (e) of the Federal Courts 
 
 86 Public Service Employment Act § 66. 
 87 Id. § 67(1). 
 88 Id. §74. 
 89 Id. § 77(1). 
 90 See Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Act, S.C. 
2013, C 40, § 20 (Can.) 
 91 Mandate, FEDERAL PUBLIC SECTOR LABOUR RELATIONS AND 
EMPLOYMENT BOARD, https://pslreb-crtefp.gc.ca/en/about-us/mandate.html (last 
updated Feb. 27, 2020). 
 92 See Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Act § 20. 
 93 Id. § 20(a). 
 94 Id. § 20(b). 
 95 Id. § 20(f). 
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Act.96 The Canadian Federal Court can review Board decisions 
when it: 
(a) acted without jurisdiction, acted beyond its juris-
diction or refused to exercise its jurisdiction; (b) 
failed to observe a principle of natural justice, proce-
dural fairness or other procedure that it was required 
by law to observe; . . . [or] (e) acted, or failed to act, 
by reason of fraud or perjured evidence . . . .97 
Therefore, the Canadian Public Service is accorded a level of 
procedural protection from the Cabinet and Parliament through the 
complaint procedure and trial-like hearings that are statutorily af-
forded to Public Service employees and applicants. 
D. Location of IRB Members in the Public Service 
According to John Richards, former Chief Justice of the Federal 
Court of Appeal of Canada and current NAFTA adjudicator, the in-
dependence of a particular administrative tribunal is “determined by 
its enabling statute,” and the standard of independence depends “on 
the language of the statute under which the agency acts . . . .”98 The 
enabling statute for IRB members, the IRPA, details how the Refu-
gee Protection Division is appointed and removed, and how reliant 
they are on the PSEA.99 IRPA states that members of the Refugee 
Protection Division are to be “appointed in accordance with the Pub-
lic Service Employment Act.”100 Therefore, these board members 
undergo “written tests, [and] are screened and interviewed by IRB 
officials, external experts and panels . . . before being recommended 
by the Minister for appointment.”101 
 
 96 Id. § 34(1). 
 97 Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, C F-7, § 18.1(4)(a), (b), (e) (Can.). 
 98 John Richards, Administrative Tribunals in Canada: An Overview 8 (Nov. 
2007), http://www.aihja.org/images/users/ARCHIVES/docutheque-
docs/EReportCanada2.pdf. 
 99 Act, rules and regulations, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BOARD OF 
CANADA, https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/act-rules-regulations/Pages/in-
dex.aspx (Feb. 4, 2020). 
 100 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, C 27, § 169.1(2) 
(Can.). 
 101 Colaiacovo, supra note 10, at 124. 
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More important, however, are the protections that these mem-
bers have with regard to removal from office. Unlike the provision 
asserting that appointments must be made pursuant to PSEA,102 
IRPA makes no reference whatsoever in their provision on com-
plaints and removals as being tied to the PSEA. Any disciplinary 
measures against a member of the board can only be taken on a “for 
cause” basis, particularly when a member “has become incapaci-
tated from the proper execution of that office by reason of infirmity, 
has been guilty of misconduct, has failed in the proper execution of 
that office or has been placed, by conduct or otherwise, in a position 
that is incompatible with due execution of that office.”103 Therefore, 
the Prime Minister of Canada does not have the power to remove a 
member of the board “at-will.” Furthermore, even after this good 
cause process to decide disciplinary measures, there must still be a 
process where fact-finding, mediation, and/or inquiries may be 
taken before termination.104 However, given the statute’s silence, 
IRB members do not seem to be entitled to the Labour Relations Act 
hearing process. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Problems Facing the Canadian System 
Members of the IRB, particularly the Refugee Protection Divi-
sion, face serious problems with regard to public trust, which stem 
from their view of bias and lack of insulation from political objec-
tives. This is especially apparent with the widely disparate asylum 
grant rates between different members’ jurisdictions. 
In 2001, Dr. Lubomyr Luciuk, a former Board member of the 
Refugee Protection Division, wrote an opinion piece that was pub-
lished in four major Canadian newspapers105 entitled “How 
 
 102 See Public Service Employment Act, S.C. 2003, C 22, § 29(1) (Can.). 
 103 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act § 176(2). 
 104 Id. § 177(a-d). 
 105 Brian Hill & Andrew Russel, Man Nicknamed ‘Dr. No’ Because he Denied 
so Many Refugees, GLOBAL NEWS (Feb. 5, 2019, 7:36 AM), https://global-
news.ca/news/4903246/immigration-refugee-board-dr-no-rehired-asylum-
claims/. 
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‘Refugees’ and Terrorists Get Into Canada.”106 In his first two sen-
tences, he claimed that the first lesson that refugee claimants must 
learn before they arrive is to “[b]e a liar.”107 He claims that they lie 
about having no identity documents, are vague about who they are 
and where they are from, and feign crying.108 If they follow these 
steps, Luciuk claims that achieving refugee status would be a simple 
cakewalk—“unless,” as he pointedly speculates, “you are an utter 
imbecile . . . .”109 As if he has not already gotten to his point, he con-
cludes that 
If the IRB continues to operate as it has, then just 
about anyone and everyone who wants to get into 
Canada will . . . Then our country will disappear, as 
surely as New York’s World Trade Center vanished 
in a holocaust perpetrated by the terrorists who ex-
ploited our lax immigration laws to worm their way 
amongst us.110 
It was then no surprise then that Luciuk—or as he proudly 
named himself, “Dr. No”—would deny more than ninety percent of 
the asylum claims that he heard during his service as a member be-
tween 1996 and 1998.111 In 2019, despite a review process of his 
performance those years, “Dr. No” was brought back in as a Board 
member as part of a Legacy Task Force, “a special group of retired 
refugee judges rehired to deal with a backlog of roughly 5,500 cases 
dating back to at least December 2012.”112 
Luciuk is by no means a complete outlier in the obscenely dis-
parate grant rates. Based off a comprehensive study of asylum grant 
rates of each Board member in 2006,113 the disparate granting rates 
 
 106 Lubomyr Luciuk, How “Refugees” and Terrorists Get into Canada, 
http://www.infoukes.com/newpathway/Page839.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2020). 
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 111 Hill, supra note 105. 
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 113 Sean Rehaag, Troubling Patterns in Canadian Refugee Adjudication, 39 
OTTAWA L. REV. 335, 349 (2007), https://yorkspace.li-
brary.yorku.ca/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10315/9958/Rehaag-Troubling-Pat-
terns.pdf?sequence=1. 
76 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:59 
 
are more systemic. This study, published in the Ottawa Law Review, 
flagged the five Board members with the most extreme variations 
from the mean grant rate in those who grant and those who deny.114 
Beginning with those of which were excessively positive in their 
grant rates, Susan Kitchner, out of 107 cases presented in 2006, 
granted 92.52% of those claims; Dominique Lederoq, out of eighty 
cases presented, granted 91.25% of those claims; and Gilles Ethier, 
out of 138 cases presented, granted 95.65% of those claims.115 On 
the other hand, the grant rates of the five most negative are much 
more shocking: Sarwanjit Randhawa, out of eighty-four cases pre-
sented, granted only 19.05% of those claims; Wilbert Wilson, out of 
seventy-two cases presented, granted only 16.67% of those claims; 
and Roger Houde, out of ninety cases, granted only 6.67% of those 
presented.116 
What, then, do such disparate grant rates mean for the perception 
of the Board and general trust of that Board? Such large denial rates 
in excess of eighty to ninety percent breed an idea that some Board 
members may have made up their minds before the actual hearing 
itself. For example, University of Toronto law professor and former 
litigator for refugee claimants, Hilary Evans Cameron,117 asserts that 
refugees “must be presumed to be telling the truth until proven oth-
erwise”118 as evidenced by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms.119 
However, the Board is plagued with other valid criticisms as 
well. For instance, one study found that “members had difficulty ad-
ministering and assessing the evidence, understanding the political 
and social conditions in other countries, interpreting administrative 
and international law and understanding the rules of politeness and 
decorum.”120 That same study also found that rates of “cultural mis-
understanding, prejudice and stereotyping” were significantly high 
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 117 Hilary Evans Cameron, UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO: CENTER FOR ETHICS, 
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1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, § 11(d) (U.K.). 
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for members of the Board.121 Another criticism leveled against the 
IRB is its failure to develop a settled internal case law.122 In the 
United States, the BIA produces case law that the court itself relies 
upon and which attorneys refer to in all filings and hearings.123 Be-
cause none of the Canadian Board hearings rely on such settled in-
ternal case law, some argue that this “suggest[s] a suboptimal level 
of engagement with the subject matter . . . .”124 
As a result of all of these criticisms, there is no surprise that the 
general public seems to have such a poor trust of Board members in 
general.125 What possible options does Canada have in boosting 
public trust? 
B. Argument for Insulation and Trust 
Lawmakers and legal practitioners each have their part to play 
in achieving a better level of trust for the IRB. First, this section will 
focus on the practical arguments that legal practitioners in the field 
could make to not only invalidate potentially unfair results to their 
clients, but to also rehabilitate the image of the Board without re-
sorting to the policy tools that lawmakers possess. Second, I will 
argue that lawmakers would better rehabilitate the image of the IRB 
by providing the level of removal protections that the Public Service 
has in the PSEA rather than its own statutory protections. 
The key for rehabilitation through litigation is arguing attitudi-
nal or institutional bias in direct violation of the common law and 
the Canadian Bill of Rights. A critical issue that many in the field 
seem to be faced with is the limited amount of judicial review that 
the Federal Court of Canada has over its decisions. While it is true 
that IRPA allows judicial review “with respect to any matter,”126 the 
types of cases appealed to the Federal Court of Canada are limited 
by the Federal Courts Act.127 Such appeals for judicial review to the 
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Federal Court are only permitted if at least one of six grounds pre-
viously mentioned is established.128 These grounds face a notori-
ously high bar of tribunal wrongdoing that must have been met, such 
as anything related to proper jurisdiction129 or a failure in “ob-
serv[ing] a principle of natural justice, procedural fairness or other 
procedure it was required by law to observe.”130 Therefore, on its 
face, it seems like a refugee appealing their denial of entry would 
have a very difficult chance to have their case appealed to the Fed-
eral Court. 
However, there is a body of law, rarely used in the field of IRB 
appeal, that could potentially prove useful in bringing about real in-
dependence and trust to the Canadian judiciary: the common law 
rule of nemo judex in sua causa debet esse.131 Literally translated to 
“no man shall be a judge in his own cause,”132 the rule has come to 
be recognized as a doctrine against administrative bias, which could 
“render any administrative action void and thereby subject to suc-
cessful judicial review.”133 Because this has been recognized as a 
principle of natural justice,134 and the Canadian Bill of Rights has 
expressly found that a “fair and public hearing by an independent 
and impartial tribunal” is a basic right,135 practitioners would be 
able to argue that this is a valid ground of appeal to the Federal 
Court. This would be instrumental in minimizing the risk of Board 
member abuse of the likes of “Dr. No” while also increasing the 
level of trust since another set of independent eyes will be allowed 
to review the issue. Canadian common law has recognized two 
forms of bias that are relevant to the issue at hand: attitudinal bias 
and institutional bias.136 
While bias is typically found more often in the areas of pecuni-
ary or institutional bias, attitudinal bias, being “in favour of a 
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particular outcome,” indeed happens and has been identified before 
through judicial review.137 Generally, Canadian courts hold that the 
test for attitudinal bias is presence of an independence of mind.138 
According to a landmark case on this doctrine, Bethany Care Centre 
v. United Nurses of Alberta, the only way to succeed in a claim of 
attitudinal bias is to show that the adjudicator could not “form an 
honest conclusion regardless of his sympathies or loyalties[.]”139 
Furthermore, in Franklin v. Minister of Town and Country Planning, 
the British court did not find attitudinal bias;140 however, the court 
crucially looked toward the previous language of the adjudicator un-
der review, indicating that such language can be used as a basis of 
determining whether there was true independence of mind.141 Based 
on this case law, practitioners clearly have options when dealing 
with particular Board members. For example, when faced with 
Board members such as “Dr. No,” there is a significant chance of 
victory in a federal appeal when they have been very vocal that ref-
ugees are always liars or if they have indicated a strong proclivity 
against refugee entrance. Attitudinal bias can, and should, be argued 
if institutional trust and legitimacy is sought. Moreover, attitudinal 
bias could also be argued for those judges who have abysmally low 
grant rates (i.e. below ten percent) and who have those low grant 
rates against refugees from particular locations in the world. Alt-
hough this is not conclusive evidence, the Federal Courts Act re-
quires no such absolute burden of proof; in fact, they may choose to 
grant this relief “if it is satisfied” that such an instance is occur-
ring.142 
Not only do practitioners have the option to argue attitudinal 
bias, but they also have the chance to argue institutional bias under 
this doctrine. The point of focus for such practitioners should be the 
reappointment process of Board members; while they are initially 
appointed for three year terms, these members “are eligible for re-
appointment in the same or another capacity” when that term comes 
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to an end.143 While such a reappointment process seems normal on 
its face because appointing a completely new person “takes between 
six and twelve months and $100,000 to fully train a new mem-
ber,”144 how it is being done has raised some concerns of political 
bias. Board members are recommended for reappointment through 
an internal IRB Performance Review Committee, which is officially 
charged with “overseeing the appraisal process and providing to the 
Minister ‘at the end of a member’s term as advice on reappoint-
ment.’”145 Given their expertise as to what works and what does not, 
it would be expected that the Minister would provide a significant 
level of deference to such a recommendation; in fact, the opposite 
seems to be the case. In the period of January 1, 2006 and March 31, 
2009, out of eighty-nine Board members that were recommended 
for reappointment, the Governor-in-Council only reappointed forty-
two percent of them.146 Therefore, rather than reappointing individ-
uals who have been found by their own agency to be competent, the 
Minister and Governor-in-Council chose the alternative of spending 
$4,300,000 on training all of these new appointees and dozens of 
cumulative years of training for new appointees.147 Because the IRB 
chairperson in that period, Jean Guy Fleury, intimated that “the Min-
ister’s discretion over reappointments created a politicized pro-
cess,”148 it is quite possible to make an argument of institutional bias 
and thus form a basis of appeal to the Federal Court. 
As a doctrine in Canadian law, the test for institutional bias in 
the administrative context is spelled out in R v. Lippe, which asks 
“whether a well-informed person would have a reasonable appre-
hension of bias in a substantial number of cases.”149 More specifi-
cally, such an apprehension must be rooted deeply in a “reasonable 
person standard,” where the apprehension is “a reasonable one, held 
by reasonable and right-minded persons, applying themselves to the 
question and obtaining thereon the required information.”150 Just as 
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in attitudinal bias, language by adjudicators or ministers is fair game 
in determining a reasonable apprehension.151 Practitioners may be 
able to argue institutional bias because, in the mind of a reasonable 
person, the combination of abysmally low grant rates for certain 
members, the public comments that Ministers have made in the past 
regarding the subject,152 and the low reappointment rate indicate that 
the institution has become so politicized as to render it incapable of 
providing an impartial tribunal under the Canadian Bill of Rights. 
Therefore, such a maelstrom of different factors could provide use-
ful tools for the everyday practitioner to find the necessary review 
in Federal Court where a more independent set of eyes may provide 
the claimant a fairer day in court. 
Finally, lawmakers themselves have the chance to improve upon 
this system by providing Board members with more protection 
against removal and disciplinary action; although this may not sub-
stantively affect levels of bias or politicization, this would at least 
provide some sort of boost in the national trust of the institution that 
the government is indeed committed to a fair and impartial tribunal 
for refugee claimants. The easiest route for lawmakers is to fully 
incorporate the IRB within the Public Service. Under IRPA, the IRB 
is not bound by the PSEA’s removal protections because they are 
provided with their own removal provisions.153 As mentioned be-
fore, some level of “good cause” must exist in order for disciplinary 
action to take place against Board members; however, they are not 
entitled to the complaint process that members of the Public Service 
have, that is, a trial-like hearing in front of the Federal Labour Re-
lations Board.154 Though in certain circumstances they may have the 
right to hearings, mediation, or investigations, they are not entitled 
to them as a right as members of Board.155 Therefore, it seems that 
Board members could theoretically be removed with much less pro-
cess than members of the Public Service. To increase the level of 
trust in its immigration institutions, Canadian lawmakers would do 
well in incorporating the PSEA protections here. 
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By increasing the chances of federal judicial review and provid-
ing a much more insulated removal process, this combination of ac-
tions would provide at least a better level of trust in the institution, 
much like a scholarly article is given much more credence when peer 
reviewed. 
C. Problems Facing the American System 
1. General Public Image 
The Executive Office of Immigration Review also deals with an 
unwelcome image and general lack of trust, particularly in major 
American media outlets. For example, in August 2019, Attorney 
General Barr appointed six immigration judges to the Board of Im-
migration Appeals.156 While this is not usually a cause for concern, 
the impartiality of these judges was called into question when they 
were notorious for significantly high rates of asylum denial: well 
over eighty-five percent.157 Three of these immigration judges have 
received strong complaints in the past: two have been selected from 
a court that has “drawn complaints of unfair proceedings from im-
migration attorneys and advocates”158; the other has been known to 
have an extensive history of denying asylum claims to domestic vi-
olence victims.159 
Claims of impartiality, however, do not stop there. Also in Au-
gust 2019, Barr proposed an interim rule under section 553 of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA)160 that would give the director 
of EOIR, who is himself not an immigration judge, “the power to 
personally decide the longest-running cases.”161 Such plenary power 
wielded by an appointed political figure would no doubt imply that 
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immigration judges are not insulated. However, such politicization 
of the immigration judiciary is not specific to President Trump, de-
spite its prevalence in the news; significant studies and scholarship 
have alleged that the George W. Bush Administration either con-
doned or encouraged hiring of immigration judges along political 
lines, illustrating the propensity of the Executive to use immigration 
judges for political objectives.162 
2. Lucia v. SEC and the Removal of Examinations 
In 2018, concern over the bias and politicization of immigration 
judges reemerged after the Supreme Court ruling in Lucia v. SEC.163 
Before going into the facts and procedural posture of the case, it is 
important to note the unique structure of the SEC ALJ appointment 
process. The SEC has been given the authority by Congress to “en-
force the nation’s securities laws.”164 In hearing cases, the SEC typ-
ically has an ALJ conduct proceedings.165 However, staff members, 
rather than the Commission itself, select the five ALJs that hear se-
curities cases.166 As part of their duties, SEC ALJs have the powers 
of “supervising discovery; issuing, revoking, or modifying subpoe-
nas; deciding motions; ruling on the admissibility of evidence; ad-
ministering oaths; hearing and examining witnesses; generally 
‘[r]egulating the course of’ the proceeding and the ‘conduct of the 
parties and their counsel’; and imposing sanctions for ‘contemptu-
ous conduct’ or violations of procedural requirements.”167 In fact, 
SEC ALJs have authority “comparable to” a federal district judge.168 
After a hearing, the ALJ makes conclusions about “‘issues of fact 
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[and] law,’” and the appropriate penalties to impose.169 Thereafter, 
the SEC may choose to review this decision “upon request or sua 
sponte,” or it can choose to not review the decision, where it will 
then become final and representative of the Commission’s intent.170 
In Lucia, the SEC initiated an administrative proceeding against 
Raymond Lucia, who owned and operated an investment com-
pany.171 The SEC alleged that he had used a “misleading slideshow 
presentation to deceive prospective clients” in marketing his new 
retirement savings strategy entitled “Buckets of Money.”172 After 
being charged by the SEC under the Investment Advisers Act, ALJ 
Cameron Elliot was assigned to hear Lucia’s case.173 A nine-day 
trial proceeded with testimony and argument, and Judge Elliot de-
termined that Lucia was in violation of the Investment Advisers Act, 
resulting in civil penalties of $300,000 and “a lifetime bar from the 
investment industry.”174 It should be noted that the SEC charged El-
liot with making factual findings.175 On appeal, Lucia argued that 
the hearing he was afforded in front of the ALJ was constitutionally 
invalid because the ALJs for the SEC are “Officers of the United 
States” and should thus be appointed only by the President, “Courts 
of Law,” or “Heads of Departments.”176 Because the ALJ was not 
appointed by the Commission itself, a “Head[] of Department[],” 
but instead by SEC staff members, Lucia pointed out that Judge El-
liot had no constitutional authority to hear his case.177 On the other 
hand, the SEC argued that Lucia’s argument fails because these 
ALJs are not “Officers” but are “‘mere employees’—officials with 
lesser responsibilities who fall outside the Appointments Clause’s 
ambit.”178 After the D.C. Circuit rejected Lucia’s argument, the Su-
preme Court of the United States granted certiorari on the issue of 
whether SEC ALJs are “Officers” or “mere employees.”179 
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Reversing the D.C. Circuit,  the Court cited three key cases that 
have previously dealt with Appointments Clause questions: United 
States v. Germaine,180 Buckley v. Valeo,181 and Freytag v. Commis-
sioner.182 In Germaine, the Court established that a requirement for 
being an “Officer” is that the individual “must occupy a ‘continuing’ 
position established by law to qualify as an officer.”183 The Court 
easily found that SEC ALJs fall under this prong as they are statu-
torily set up as a continuing position.184 In Valeo, the Court added 
that to be an “Officer,” the position must also “exercise significant 
authority pursuant to the laws of the United States.”185 On this ques-
tion, the Court has historically had trouble defining what “signifi-
cant authority” means. In Freytag, the Court held that special trial 
judges that help the Tax Court judges are indeed officers and not 
mere employees because “they perform more than ministerial tasks. 
They take testimony, conduct trials, rule on the admissibility of ev-
idence, and have the power to enforce compliance with discovery 
orders.”186 In other words, these tasks for Tax Court judges were 
dispositive in making them “Officers” rather than mere employees. 
Transplanting the standard that the Freytag Court used for much 
more independent Article I tax judges to Article II ALJs, the Lucia 
Court held that because SEC ALJs have the power to “ensure fair 
and orderly adversarial hearings” through the use of taking testi-
mony, admitting or denying evidence, and other tasks of federal dis-
trict court judges while also being given the power of finality when 
the SEC refuses to review the decision, SEC ALJs appropriately fall 
within the sphere of an “Officer” rather than a mere employee.187 
More specifically, the Court considered them to be inferior officers 
and must be appointed in accordance with the Appointments 
Clause.188 
The effect of this decision was by no means narrow; in fact, Pres-
ident Trump used this as a springboard for presidential policy. In 
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Executive Order 13,843, released on July 10, 2018, President Trump 
indicated that the Lucia decision indicates that “at least some—and 
perhaps all—ALJs are ‘Officers of the United States’ and thus sub-
ject to the Constitution’s Appointments Clause, which governs who 
may appoint such officials.”189 The President’s claims also call into 
question whether the competitive service selection procedures, in-
cluding examinations, are still compatible with the Appointments 
Clause.190 Therefore, to “reduce the likelihood of successful Ap-
pointments Clause challenges,” the President, pursuant to section 
3302(1) of Title 5 of the U.S. Code, has ordered that competitive 
hiring rules and examinations be excepted for the selection and ap-
pointment of ALJs.191 Other than requiring the baseline rule that 
these ALJs have a license to practice law, the only requirements in 
selection “shall be made in accordance with such regulations and 
practices as the head of the agency concerned finds necessary.”192 
In other words, the only requirements are those which the agency 
deems necessary to be qualified. No longer do the civil service com-
petitive hiring rules have binding effect on these ALJs; in fact, un-
less there is a successful judicial challenge to this order, ALJs for 
each agency seem to be only subject to the whims of the hiring de-
partment, rather than a potentially more independent OPM. 
Because immigration judges are ALJs and potentially subject to 
Lucia’s new understanding of ALJs as “Officers,” the possibility of 
further politicization of immigration is much higher since the Attor-
ney General no longer needs to conduct examinations and, as was 
mentioned at the beginning of this Note, has the power to remove 
these judges at-will as is his or her right as a “Head[] of Depart-
ment[].” What options do practitioners have in (1) arguing against 
Lucia’s application to immigration judges, and (2) arguing for in-
creased civil service protections of immigration judges? 
D. Arguments For Insulation 
In this Part, I will offer two potential arguments that could be 
made to either avoid or mitigate the consequences of Lucia’s affects 
on the immigration judiciary: (1) Although immigration judges are 
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“Officers,” they are principal offers rather than inferior officers, 
thereby affording them the insulation of a Senate confirmation pro-
cess; and/or (2) Lucia’s scope does not extend to immigration judges 
because immigration judges are set up as direct representatives of 
the Attorney General rather than distinct positions within already 
independent executive agencies. This Note will argue that the sec-
ond option is the most likely to succeed. 
1. The Principal Officer Argument 
This “Principal Officer” argument can be more aptly regarded 
as a “lean into the punch” strategy because it assumes that Lucia 
applies to the case at hand and therefore seeks to mitigate the result. 
The benefit of arguing principal officer status for immigration 
judges is that, if achieved, it would result in the requirement that the 
Senate confirm each immigration judge.193 Such a result would lead 
to two branches of government signing off on the appointment, a 
form of insulation built within the Constitution.194 A brief overview 
of the case law on this subject is worth repeating. In Morrison v. 
Olson, the Court held that there are four factors to consider in deter-
mining who is an inferior or principal officer: (1) the officer’s re-
movability by a superior executive branch official; (2) the scope of 
the officer’s duties; (3) the scope of the officer’s jurisdiction; and 
(4) the tenure of the office at issue.195 However, unsatisfied with the 
fact that such a rubric implies that every officer that is not a Cabinet 
member is inferior, the Court revisited the issue in Edmond v. United 
States.196 The Court modified the test with a much more strict rubric, 
stating that inferior officers are those “whose work is directed and 
supervised at some level by others who were appointed by Presiden-
tial nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.”197 
However, these cases were decided in a pre-Lucia world. There-
fore, it is also worth noting how different circuits have adapted these 
cases after Lucia. It seems that circuits prefer the Edmond test rather 
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than the Morrison test in application.198 In Arthrex v. Smith & 
Nephew, there was a patent dispute between both parties that was 
being heard by the Patent Trial Appeal Board (PTAB).199 Arthrex 
argued that under the precedent established by Lucia, the PTAB 
ALJs selected under the competitive hiring rules and examination 
were unconstitutionally appointed under the Appointments 
Clause.200 On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that these judges were 
principal officers under the Appointments Clause and conducted an 
analysis under the Edmond test to determine this.201 Considering the 
Edmond analysis to be a balancing test with no “exclusive criterion,” 
they viewed it as a three-prong determination: “(1) whether an ap-
pointed official has the power to review and reverse the officers’ 
decision; (2) the level of supervision and oversight an appointed of-
ficial has over the officers; and (3) the appointed official’s power to 
remove the officers.”202 It should be noted that the Federal Circuit 
considered the Morrison factors to be relevant under Edmond.203 If 
these prongs tip more in favor of autonomy for the officer, then an 
officer would be more likely to be a principal officer under Ed-
mond.204 Because the Director of the PTAB cannot directly order a 
review of ALJ decisions and the lack of unfettered authority to re-
move these ALJs, the court determined that this was sufficient to 
render them principal officers.205 
How would this translate to immigration judges? Under the re-
view prong, the balancing scale tips slightly in favor being an infe-
rior officer. Under 8 C.F.R. section 1003.1(h)(1), “the Board [of Im-
migration Appeals] shall refer to the Attorney General for review of 
its decision all cases that (i) the Attorney General directs the Board 
to refer to him; (ii) [t]he Chairman or a majority of the Board be-
lieves should be referred to the Attorney General for review.”206 Un-
der this process known as “self-referral,” the Attorney General has 
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the right to review any decision of the BIA.207 Although the Attor-
ney General is not required to do this, it does lean in favor of inferi-
ority under this prong. Under the supervisory prong, the balance 
weighs much more in favor of being principal officers. There is very 
little procedure on an immigration judge’s day-to-day activity that 
is expressly provided by the Attorney General. Whatever policy 
does exist, a significant portion of that policy is for practitioners 
themselves seeking to represent clients or make motions.208 Under 
the removal prong, there is very little that can be argued here given 
the very uncertain nature of this after the President’s Executive Or-
der.209 
      Nevertheless, if Morrison is still taken into consideration when 
conducting an Edmond analysis, then the balance would tip much 
further in favor of being a principal officer. Considering the scope 
of the officer’s duties, immigration judges have a pretty broad set of 
responsibilities: They take testimony, admit or deny evidence, order 
removals, and all other duties usually found within a full trial.210 
Although their jurisdiction is limited to immigration issues, this is 
by no means a small field, as evidenced by the over 900,000 cases 
currently pending as of the time of this writing.211 Finally, the tenure 
of these immigration judges have no definite limit of any kind; in 
fact, they serve until either they are removed at-will or for good 
cause (depending on how courts rule on their status as an officer).212 
Based off of this line of reasoning, at trial and at oral argument, 
going through this Edmond analysis could provide a way to mitigate 
the politicized dangers of at-will employment for immigration 
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judges by “leaning into the punch” and avoiding a complete politi-
cized hiring. However, there are very real problems with this argu-
ment, aside from the uncertainties of trial. Firstly, making this argu-
ment sacrifices removal protections for non-political hiring. Be-
cause principal officers serve at the pleasure of the President or cab-
inet member, they can still be removed just as inferior officers can 
be. Second, non-political hiring is an assumption from this result; it 
does not consider that the Senate may be controlled by the same 
party as the President, rendering any gains from this argument futile. 
Third, appointments could be significantly drawn out to no end 
based on partisan politicking; in fact, the recent Kavanaugh confir-
mation process and the presidential cabinet appointments after Pres-
ident Trump’s inauguration indicate this as the new normal rather 
than a hiccup in history.213 Finally, this last point can extend further; 
if the confirmation process is drawn out, that would mean that cases 
would be piling up with no officials hearing cases. 
Although the arguments to designate principal officer status are 
convincing, in terms of outcome and policy, they fail to live up to 
standards of judicial economy and non-political removal. Thus, this 
Note recommends the next argument. 
2. Lucia does not apply to the case at hand 
While less technical, this argument employs the tools of analo-
gizing and distinguishing the standards set up in Freytag and Lucia. 
While Lucia may have been decided correctly, this argument fo-
cuses on how Lucia just simply does not apply to immigration 
judges. The key to doing this is pointing out the very key differences 
between the positions in Freytag and Lucia with the position of im-
migration judges. In Freytag, the position in question was that of a 
Special Trial Judge (STJ).214 STJs work under Tax Court judges.215 
The United States Tax Court is an Article I court established by Con-
gress under the constitutional authority granted them to “constitute 
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Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court.”216 In other words, these 
judges do not answer to the executive, but rather to Congress, or 
whenever there is a need for judicial review, to the appropriate Court 
of Appeal. They can only be terminated “for inefficiency, neglect of 
duty, or malfeasance in office.”217 Put differently, tax court judges, 
and by extension STJs, are very independent figures who have sig-
nificant autonomy in their choices and with little consequences for 
particular decisions made that are lawful. Moreover, the SEC ALJs 
are within a similar status. Although they are an executive agency, 
they are considered an independent executive agency which is gen-
erally known to be those agencies where “Congress has given an 
agency’s top-level decision makers job security.”218 These agencies 
are typically those multi-member agencies such as the Federal Re-
serve, the SEC, the Commodities and Futures Trading Commission, 
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.219 In terms of deci-
sion making, these agencies retain significant discretion in policy 
choice because of the mere fact that they can only be removed based 
on some form of good cause.220 
However, this level of independence cannot be made of immi-
gration judges. In fact, as they stand at the moment, immigration 
judges legally are not independent in the most common use of the 
phrase. For instance, immigration judges actually represent the At-
torney General in all immigration proceedings as adjudicators.221 
Theoretically, under the Immigration and Nationality Act, there is 
no specific requirement for immigration judges.222 In other words, 
the immigration judges are the Attorney General in the simplest 
form. Of course, these judges take evidence, hear cases, and handle 
other trial-like activity.223 However, they only do so in lieu of the 
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Attorney General;224 Congress did not separately task them to con-
duct these proceedings, and Congress did not provide them with the 
same removal protection in the same form as they did with the SEC, 
the Federal Reserve, and other independent executive agencies. 
Therefore, if and when a practitioner uses Lucia to argue that immi-
gration judges are also inferior officers because of their significant 
authority to conduct these trials just like the STJs in Freytag, the 
clear response is to question the level of authority these judges really 
are exercising. As direct representatives of a principal officer, as a 
matter of law, there is not any significant authority that is being ex-
ercised without the consent of the Attorney General. Furthermore, 
this argument can be used offensively as well rather than defen-
sively. In response to the Executive Order removing competitive hir-
ing rules, practitioners seeking to bring those protections back in a 
binding way for immigration judges can make this argument and 
ensure that either the Sessions or the Gonzales method of immigra-
tion judge selection remains. 
As previously stated, though there is not a whole lot of technical 
basis for this argument, the effectiveness of this argument is that 
there has yet to be a challenge to any agency that has not been an 
independent executive agency. As of the time of this writing, no 
challenge has been leveled at immigration judges and their validity. 
Therefore, if a challenge is to be made in the near future, this argu-
ment has both the benefit of (1) flipping Lucia on its head by high-
lighting how little legal significant authority immigration judges re-
ally possess, as well as (2) retaining both the appointment and re-
moval protections from political influence. 
V. CONCLUSION 
After going over both the Canadian and American immigration 
adjudication systems, this Note first identified the significant prob-
lem of public trust and politicization that these institutions are facing 
in recent years, and identified the solution to this as being the need 
to entrench the respective immigration judiciaries within their civil 
service systems of appointment and removal. Thereafter, this Note 
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sought to provide real, practical methods that could be used to 
achieve this goal. 
In the Canadian system, the general public is struggling with 
how to handle IRB members without abysmally low asylum grant 
rates that may be fueled either by attitudinal or, worse, institutional 
bias. Because of the potential bias, practitioners could make argu-
ments on the basis of common law precedents that have been used 
in the field of administrative law to ensure that these judges are in-
sulated from political whims by increasing judicial review by Cana-
dian Federal Courts. Furthermore, this Note also suggested that Ca-
nadian lawmakers fully integrate the features of removal protections 
that the Canadian Public Service normally receives in place of the 
weaker protections that the IRB currently has by statute. 
In the American system, this Note highlighted the most recent 
conundrum facing the immigration courts in lieu of the Supreme 
Court decision in Lucia. Detailing the methodology used by the 
Court in Lucia in determining whether an official is an “Officer” 
under the Appointments Clause or a mere employee, this Note then 
provided two arguments that practitioners could make in the field to 
either defend against a challenge against the “employee” status of 
immigration judges or ensure that competitive hiring rules and ex-
aminations remain for immigration judge selection. 
By setting forth these arguments, this Note has sought to solve 
the very hypothetical it began with. Entrenching an immigration ju-
diciary further within the civil service system creates a level of com-
fort and job security that keeps judges from making decisions with 
one eye looking over their shoulders. 
 
